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Abstract 
The object of this study is to assess the role of trade in the transmission of currency shocks across 
geographically close countries. The analysis will focus on identifying and comparing the degree of 
vulnerability of new EU member states from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to 
currency shocks. 
We interpret the interactions that a centre-periphery model identifies for periphery countries as a 
possible description of existing interdependencies among CEECs. According to the centre periphery 
model discussed by Corsetti et al. (1998b), “if there is no pass-through, then direct bilateral trade links 
may play a more important role than competition in the third market in determining the transmission 
of exchange rate shocks in the periphery. If there is full pass-through, a high share of bilateral trade 
within a region can actually limit the extent of beggar-thy-neighbour effects.”  These effects are 
emphasised by a high degree of export similarity among the countries in the periphery. 
As a result of the heterogeneity in pass-through and trade structures, it is very difficult to derive a 
unitary policy implication on the potential sustainability of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) II. 
Yet it is possible to single out the country pairs in which the likelihood of transmitting currency 
shocks is higher. Preliminary results point out that (other things being equal and given the contained 
intra-periphery trade) the transmission of currency disturbances is lower if the disturbance originates 
in countries with low a pass-through rate (the Slovak and Czech Republics, Estonia and Latvia) and 
higher if it originates in countries with a high pass-through rate (Poland, Hungary and Slovenia).  
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Has Trade any Importance 
in the Transmission of Currency Shocks? 
An Empirical Application for New EU Member States 
from Central and Eastern European Countries  
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 28/July 2004 
Roberta De Santis 
Introduction 
The object of this study is to assess the role of trade in the transmission of currency shocks 
across geographically close countries. The analysis will focus on identifying and comparing 
the degree of vulnerability of EU members from Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
to currency shocks. 
Recent empirical evidence shows that post-shock transmission mechanisms seem to be a 
continuation of close linkages existing during stable periods. Studies by Forbes (2001), 
Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000), Caramazza et al. (1999), Glick & Rose (1998) and Eichengreen 
et al. (1996) have provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that currency crises spread 
from one country to another because of trade linkages. They also show that explanations of 
the international transmission of currency shocks based on trade links across countries 
perform empirically better than explanations based on similarities in the macroeconomic 
characteristics of the economies concerned. 
The relevance of trade has been considered mainly in empirical analyses characterised by few 
linkages with theoretical tools. Most of the above-mentioned empirical studies identified and 
measured trade links by means of total export shares, in either bilateral or common markets. 
Theoretical papers studying competitive devaluation in a centre periphery (CP) framework 
suggest that further progress in the empirical testing of the relevance of trade as a 
transmission channel can be achieved through a deeper analysis of trade structure and firms’ 
pricing behaviour.  
In the analysis that follows, the periphery will consist of a group of eight CEECs. We 
interpret the interactions that the CP model identifies for periphery countries as a possible 
description of the interdependencies that exist among geographically close countries. We 
build trade indicators for the CEECs and use these to gauge how specific features of their 
trade structures could affect the vulnerability of these countries to exchange-rate shocks. 
Following accession to the EU, CEECs will have to adopt the euro, as no opt-out clause is 
allowed for new entrants. Official positions of the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank indicate that the CEECs should go through the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) II before adoption of the euro. This would imply two years in the ERM II system with 
a review of Maastricht Treaty indicators at the end of the first year. With few exceptions the 
CEECs will eventually have to change their exchange-rate regime, since at the moment most 
of them are experiencing a relatively more volatile one. 2 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
The main reasons for focussing on CEECs are because i) they have a high degree of trade 
integration with the EU, intra-regional trade occurs and they are very suitable in representing 
the periphery of the EU-15, ii) their financial markets are not yet fully developed and 
integrated, thus providing trade linkages that have a major role in transmitting the currency 
shocks and iii) as they are expected to join the ERM II, they are likely – with the exception of 
Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania, which are respectively featuring a peg to the euro and 
currency board agreements – to move, sooner or later, towards a less flexible exchange-rate 
regime.  
The proposed approach attempts to make the following contributions to the existing literature: 
i) it aims to bridge the gap between the theory and the empirics of the transmission of 
currency shocks through trade linkages; ii) it intends to explicitly take into consideration trade 
structure and firms’ pricing behaviour and their effects on the transmission of currency 
shocks; and iii) it focuses on CEECs to derive policy implications on the sustainability of the 
ERM II. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 1 surveys the theory and empirics of the 
transmission of crises through trade links. Relationships between trade features and 
vulnerability to shocks in a centre-periphery framework are described in section 2. In section 
3.1 we analyse the relationship between trade structure and currency-shock transmission. 
Some preliminary results are presented in the conclusion.  
1.  Transmission of crises through trade links: Theory and empirics 
1.1  Contagion: Some conceptual and empirical issues 
The study of international transmission mechanisms has attracted a renewed interest after the 
Asian crises,
1 whose general feature was their propagation from one or some countries to 
whole regions (i.e. ‘contagion’). After 1997 a large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature
2 has focused on identifying the economic and financial variables that prior to a crisis 
differ significantly between crisis and non-crisis countries. 
Determining whether contagion has occurred during a specific period is complicated by a 
number of econometric issues. Furthermore, isolating the channels through which crises are 
transmitted is made problematic by the interactions among various propagation mechanisms. 
Data availability often aggravates both of these difficulties. It should be emphasised, 
moreover, that there is not even consensus on exactly how contagion should be defined. 
In 1999, Forbes & Rigobon proposed a restrictive definition of contagion: the “shift 
contagion”. According to the authors this definition is useful in evaluating the effectiveness of 
international diversification, justifying multilateral intervention and differentiating among the 
various transmission mechanisms (i.e. crisis-contingent theories and non-crisis-contingent 
theories) (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001).  
Crisis-contingent theories are those that explain why transmission mechanisms change during 
a crisis and therefore why cross-market linkages increase after a shock. Non-crisis-contingent 
theories assume that transmission mechanisms are the same during a crisis as they are in more 
                                                           
1 Prior to the East Asian financial crisis there was relatively little analysis of why country-specific crises may 
spread internationally. A few economists had considered these issues after the departure of several European 
countries from the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992 and after the Mexican peso crisis in 1994. 
2 For a survey see Claessens et al. (2001). HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 3 
 
stable periods and therefore that cross-market linkages do not increase after a shock. Evidence 
of shift contagion would support the group of crisis-contingent theories, while no evidence of 
shift contagion would support the group of non-crisis-contingent theories. 
Forbes & Rigobon (2001) have shown that, although tests for contagion appear 
straightforward, they are biased because of the presence of heterodasticity, endogeneity and 
omitted variables. Pesaran & Pick (2003) Corsetti et al. (2002), Forbes & Rigobon (1999), 
Rigobon (1999) and Lomakin & Paiz (1999) have corrected empirical works for each of these 
problems, finding that in most cases no (shift) contagion has occurred in recent crises. 
Therefore these studies show that cross-market linkages after a shock are simply 
continuations of strong transmission mechanisms that exist as interdependences. 
This result suggests that there is little support for crisis-contingent channels and prompts us to 
turn to non-crisis-contingent theories. The non-crisis-contingent theories identify financial 
markets, the banking sector and trade as the main channels for the transmission of economic 
disturbances – which are not mutually exclusive – because of their links among different 
countries. Thus, after accounting for the effects of fiscal factors, financial and currency crises 
spread along the lines of trade linkages. 
This paper concentrates on trade linkages as a channel for spreading the effects of economic 
disturbances and in particular currency crises. The decision to study CEECs is based on the 
fact that in these countries, the financial markets and the banking sector are not yet fully 
developed and integrated, thus trade linkages have a major role in transmitting the shocks.  
Furthermore, recent empirical studies such as Forbes (2001), Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000), 
Caramazza et al. (1999), Glick & Rose (1998) and Eichengreen et al. (1996) have found 
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that currency and financial crises spread from one 
country to another because of trade linkages.  
1.2 The  theoretical  literature 
Theoretical and empirical investigation into the role of trade channels has to date been rather 
limited in its scope. In particular, the relevance of trade has often only been considered by 
empirical analyses.
      
To explain why crises tend to be regional, some recent theoretical models
3 have revived the 
Nurske (1944) model of competitive devaluation. According to the latter, in the context of 
bilateral trade or that with a third party (or both), when one country devalues, it becomes 
costly – in term of competitiveness and output – for other countries to maintain their parity. 
An empirical implication of this type of model is that a high volume of trade among the 
countries involved in crises could be observed. 
These models analyse how devaluations in one country spread to others adopting a centre-
periphery framework. They enable disentanglement of the income and price effects that a 
devaluation in country A in the periphery exerts on country B in the same region through 
direct links between these countries and competition in a third country of the centre (C). 
The price effect is the result of the fact that devaluations in country A, in the presence of 
nominal rigidities, improve its competitiveness. This causes both an increase in the demand 
                                                           
3 See Bentivogli & Monti (2001) for a complete survey that includes a further three, sometimes overlapping, 
categories: i) models with strategic interactions ii) models that examine the characteristics of trade structure; and 
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from centre to periphery goods and a diversion in world demand away from country B goods 
towards country A goods. The income effect operates through the improvement in the terms 
of trade for countries B and C and the worsening of those of country A. 
These two effects have been modelled by Gerlach & Smets (1995) and, in a fully micro-
founded general equilibrium model, by Corsetti et al. (1998b).
4 Both models capture bilateral 
trade and competition in the third market by describing a three-country world where countries 
A and B peg their currencies to that of country C. In the models, a nominal devaluation in 
country A translates into a competitiveness gain at least in the short term owing to either 
sticky wages or price rigidities. 
Gerlach and Smets formally model how devaluation in country A can affect trade flows and 
thereby cause a crisis in country B. They assume that the economies are structurally identical 
and that each of them produces only one specific good, but consume all three goods. A 
devaluation in country A gives rise, with sticky wages, to a fall in output, a trade deficit and a 
reduction in country B’s price level because of the fact that the prices of A goods fall in 
country B’s currency. The excess demand for money arising in country B (assuming non-
accommodating monetary policy) exerts downward pressure on the nominal interest rate – 
leading to capital outflows and reserve losses and possibly to a currency crisis.  
The model shows that the intensity of the transmission through trade is stronger the higher the 
substitutability between A and B goods is and the greater the weight of foreign goods in B’s 
consumption basket. This model highlights some important aspects. Nevertheless, belonging 
to the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework, it lacks a micro-foundation, it does not focus 
on the role played by competition in third markets and it only touches on the issue of pass-
through.  
Corsetti et al. (1998b) use a micro-foundation to develop a more detailed and rigorous model 
of how trade can transmit crises internationally. They use a general equilibrium choice–
theoretic framework to compute the welfare repercussions of a devaluation of country A’s 
currency, finding that the negative effects on a partner country as emphasised by traditional 
theory are not always present. Indeed, if the effects derived from the change in the terms of 
trade are taken into account, the results may be rather different.  
1.3  Main empirical studies 
Studies on the transmission of financial and currency crises through trade have followed 
various routes on the basis of the methodologies and variables set out in the empirical 
literature. Moreover, they are not closely linked to the theoretical literature. This literature 
might be grouped into two broad categories: i) contagion and trade linkages, and ii) contagion 
and trade structure. 
i) Contagion and trade linkages. One of the first analyses in this field was produced by 
Eichengreen et al. (1996), who tested the influence of bilateral trade and competition in the 
third market on the transmission of currency crises. They defined contagion as “a systematic 
effect on the probability of a speculative attack which stems from attacks on [an]other 
currency”. 
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To test contagion from country j to country i, they regressed a binary variable of currency 
crisis
5 – the ‘crisis dummy’ – in country i on the same variable for country j weighted by trade 
data and on other macroeconomic variables: 
 Crisisi,t = ω Wij,t Crisisj,t + ￿ I(L)i,t + ￿i,t  (1) 
where Wij for j ≠ i is equal to the weight of country j in country i’s IMF real effective 
exchange-rate index. These weights take account of both bilateral trade and competition in 
third markets.
6  
Eichengreen et al. (1996) also substituted Wij with a weight measuring relative 
macroeconomic similarity. This weight is closer to one, the more similar the standardised 
growth rates of the relevant macroeconomic variables are. I(L)i,t is an information set of 
contemporaneous and lagged macroeconomic variables. Eichengreen et al. estimated the 
equation by using a probit model with quarterly data.  
Their estimate for 20 industrial countries from 1959 to 1993 showed that the occurrence of a 
currency crisis in one country increased the likelihood of speculative attacks in other 
countries by about 8%. The coefficient of contagion ω was positive and significant when 
trade weights were used, while the macroeconomic weights did not perform as well. The 
authors therefore concluded that trade links are the main channel through which a crisis is 
transmitted. 
Caramazza et al. (1999) have estimated a similar equation using a panel probit regression with 
41 emerging market countries and, separately, 20 industrial countries during the Mexican, 
Asian and Russian crises, excluding for each crisis the first country to experience it. Their 
crisis variable is very similar in structure to than of Eichengreen et al. (1996). In country I, it 
is regressed on (among other variables) a set of external variables in the years preceding the 
crisis
7 plus a proxy for trade effect: 
 Crisisi,t = ￿TCij,t + ￿FCi,t +￿￿i,t + ￿i,t  (2) 
The proxy TC is a weighted average of the price and income effects expected to spread from 
devaluation in a partner country. Caramazza et al. choose a relative weight of one to two on 
the basis of estimates of historical export elasticities. They identify the price effect with the 
expected loss of competitiveness in country i owing to a crisis in other countries, proxying 
this effect with the change in the IMF real effective exchange-rate index for country i. This 
index weights the devaluation in partner countries both by bilateral trade and by competition 
in third markets. Caramazza et al. adjust it to exclude own-country effects by replacing the 
actual exchange-rate change and inflation of country i during the crisis with a projection 
based on trends over the three years prior to the crisis. 
The income effect is captured by an indicator of the expected output contraction of countries 
that are export markets for country i. The output contraction is measured with respect to the 
average growth rates in the three years before the crisis and trade weights are used to 
aggregate the data. FC is a set of indicators of financial linkages including the share of debt 
                                                           
5 They developed an index of foreign exchange-rate pressure as a weighted average of exchange rate changes 
and short-term interest rates relative to Germany. This variable ‘crisis’ took a value of 1 if the index was above a 
certain threshold and 0 otherwise. 
6 IMF weights only consider trade in manufacturing and are time invariant. For a detailed description of the 
methodology see IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
7The current-account balance/GDP ratio and the change in the real effective exchange-rate, in the export/GDP 
ratio and in the terms of trade. 6 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
borrowed by country i from a common creditor country and Mit is a set of macroeconomic 
variables. Caramazza et al. find that TC is not significant, but that it becomes so when 
multiplied by previous years’ current account balances. This seems to suggest that the trade 
channel significantly affects country i’s probability of crisis only when it is already suffering 
from external imbalances. 
Another interesting finding by Caramazza et al. is that region-specific dummies are not 
significantly different from each other. This suggests that the clustering of crises is explained 
by the independent variables and therefore crises are not strictly regional phenomena.  
Glick and Rose (1998) test trade against other macroeconomic factors in order to check 
whether contagion is regional. They estimate a cross-country equation with 161 countries in 
five crisis episodes: 
 Crisisi = ￿Tradei + ￿￿i + ￿I  (3) 
where Crisis is a binary variable, M is a set of macroeconomic indicators that include the 
annual growth rate of internal credit and real GDP, the current account balance divided by 
GDP and the change in the nominal effective exchange-rate during the year of crisis 
compared with the average of the past three years. Trade is an indicator of trade linkages 
defined as: 
 Tradei = () [] ( ) [ ] {} ∑ + − − + +
k
k ik k ik i ik k x x x x x x x x 0 0 0 0 / 1 * ) /(  (4) 
where xik are exports from i to k  (k≠i, 0) and 0 is the first victim country, x0 are total exports 
of country 0 and xi are total exports of country i. This indicator is a weighted average of the 
contribution of third markets for the first victim country 0 and for country i. The weights, the 
second term of the index, imply that country k is more important for countries 0 and i, the 
more similar the importance of country k is for each of them. 
Glick and Rose also use other indicators: direct trade, total trade and trade share, which they 
define respectively as follows: 
 DirectTradei = ( ) i i i i x x x x 0 0 0 0 / 1 + − −  (5) 
Total Tradei=  () [] ( )( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i i x x x x e DirectTrad Trade x x x x + + + + − − 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 / * * / 1  
Tr.Sharei= ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] {} ∑ + − − + +
k
ik k i ik k i ik k xi x x x x x x x x x x x / / / / / 1 * ) /( 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Direct trade is a measure of bilateral trade, total trade is a weighted index of bilateral trade, 
and with respect to the third market and trade share, it is an index similar to trade but 
adjusted for trade shares to control for the different sizes of the countries. These measures 
seem to be relatively insensitive to the way in which trade linkages are measured. 
Glick and Rose (1998) find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that currency crises 
spread from one country to another because of trade linkages. They accordingly conclude that 
currency crises are fundamentally regional phenomena.
8 
ii) Contagion and trade structure. Diwan and Hoeckman (1999) analyse the effects of trade 
structure on transmission of shocks in terms of “competition versus complementarity”. They 
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argue that countries with very similar export structures will compete mainly in third markets 
outside the region. In this case, the price effect of devaluations by a trade competitor will be 
negative and the positive income effect almost absent, with a consequent strong incentive to 
match the devaluation. On the other hand, if most of the trade in a region concerns goods that 
are complementary in production (i.e. intermediate goods), then the price effect of a 
devaluation by a partner is positive for all countries in the region because it enhances the 
competitiveness of the ‘joint’ production.  
Taking indicators of trade structure into account, Diwan and Hoeckman test the hypothesis of 
competition versus complementarity for East Asian countries by using a set of trade 
indicators. They analyse intra- and inter-regional demand linkages by calculating shares of 
intra-extra regional trade of each country and a trade intensity index (XI) on both total 
merchandise exports and intermediate goods defined as: 
 XIi=  (Xij/Xi)/[Mj/(Mw-Mi)] (6) 
where X and M are respectively exports and imports, and i, j and w denote the reporting 
country, the partner and the world. If this index control for the size of the partner country is 
greater than 1, trade is more intense than would be expected, given a share j of world imports. 
This index has the defect that it allows neither cross-country nor cross-time comparisons. 
Moreover, it is sensitive to the size of country i: the bigger the country, the lower the index. 
In order to test the competition hypothesis, Diwan and Hoeckman compute export 
correlations and export similarity indexes for extra- and intra-regional trade.
9 
 XSij  = ( ) [ ] ∑
a
xaj xai 100 * , min  (7) 
where xai and xaj are the industry a exports shares in country i's and j's total exports, 
calculated at the 4 digit SITC level.  
The index ranges between 0 and 100, with 0 indicating complete dissimilarity and 100 
identical export composition. The authors find a high degree of intra-regional trade in total 
and intermediate goods, supporting the close interdependence and complementarity 
hypothesis of East Asian trade.
10 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) recognise that most of the empirical studies focus on bilateral 
trade and that when third-party trade is considered, little attention is given to the commodity 
composition of potential competitors.  
The authors select groups of countries in terms of either high bilateral trade between them or 
of competition in a relevant third market, examining a sample of industrial and developing 
countries for the period 1970–98, including 80 currency crises. They choose bilateral trade 
clusters by inspecting the ratios of exports in the region to total exports of each country. For 
third-market competitors they also inspect similarities in the product composition of trade. 
                                                           
9 This measure was first proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979). 
10 According to Bentivogli and Monti (2001), “Diwan and Hoeckman’s account is unsatisfactory in relating the 
trade structure to the transmission of crisis. As the ‘new trade theories’ explain, countries which export very 
similar goods will have a large amount of bilateral (intra-industry) trade, so that competition will be strong both 
in regional markets and outside the region. This pattern of trade is typical of all industrial countries and of some 
emerging market economies as well. Diwan and Hoeckman’s ‘competition story’ probably only applies to a 
region in which all countries export largely the same raw materials, so that bilateral trade is limited and 
competition in third markets is high.” 8 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
For each cluster of countries, Kaminsky and Reinhart compare the unconditional probability 
of a crisis occurring in the next 24 months P(C) with the probability conditioned on the 
information that there is a crisis elsewhere P(C/CE). They treat the difference between these 
two probabilities as an indicator of the relevance of the trade channel. 
They find evidence that belonging to the same region as a crisis country increases the 
probability that other countries will experience a currency crisis owing to trade linkages. 
Forbes (2000) utilises firm-level information to measure the importance of trade in the 
international transmission of crises. The paper sample includes information on over 10,000 
companies from around the world during the Asian and the Russian crises. It focuses on the 
variation of different firms’ stock market performance, which not only tests which types of 
companies were most affected by these crises but also how these crises spread internationally. 
Results show that companies that had sales exposure to the crisis country or competed in the 
same industries as crisis-country exports (or both) had significantly lower stock returns during 
these two crises. The paper concludes that direct trade effects (income effects) as well as 
competition in export industries (product-competitiveness effects) “were both important 
transmission mechanisms during the later part of the Asian and the Russian crisis”. 
Forbes (2001) seeks to establish whether trade linkages are important determinants of a 
country’s vulnerability to crises originating elsewhere in the world. She maintains that trade 
can transmit crises internationally through three distinct (and possibly counteracting) 
channels: i) the competitiveness effect, when changes in relative prices affect a country’s 
ability to compete abroad; ii) the income effect, when a crisis affects income and demand for 
imports; and iii) the cheap-import effect, when a crisis reduces import prices and acts as a 
positive supply shock. 
Forbes develops a series of statistics measuring each of these linkages for a sample of 58 
countries during 16 crises from 1994 to 1999. Of particular interest is the competitiveness 
statistic, which uses 4-digit industry information to calculate how each crisis affects exports 
from other countries. The empirical results of Forbes’ study suggest that countries which 
compete with exports from a crisis country and export to the crisis country (i.e. 
competitiveness and income effects) have significantly lower stock market returns. Although 
trade linkages only partially explain stock market returns during recent crises, they are 
significantly and economically important.  
Bentivogli and Monti (2001) concentrate on trade linkages as a channel for spreading the 
effects of economic disturbances, from one source country to other countries. They compare 
the degree of vulnerability to external shocks of five Latin American countries and five Asian 
crisis countries in the 1990s, computing theoretically-backed indicators of vulnerability owing 
to trade linkages. 
The indexes show that Latin America is much less vulnerable than Asia to an international 
transmission of economic disturbances from a country in the same region. This is because of: 
i) the relatively lower openness of Latin American countries, ii) the higher share of raw 
materials in their exports and iii) the lower degree of similarity both of the manufactured 
goods exported inside their region and of those exported to their common industrial markets. 
Moreover, Southeast Asian countries are more likely than Latin American ones to transmit 
economic disturbances to industrial countries because of the higher substitutability of their 
manufactured exports with those of more advanced economies. HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 9 
 
2.  Trade features and vulnerability to currency shocks in a centre-periphery 
framework  
Previous sections have shown that one of the main shortcomings of the literature on the 
transmission of crises through trade is the fact that empirical studies are not closely linked to 
the theoretical literature. 
One of the aims of this paper is to use the theoretical results of recent, open macroeconomic 
models to develop a ‘theoretically consistent’ empirical analysis of how economic 
disturbances spread. The purpose is to obtain indications on how exposed CEECs are to 
currency shocks given their trade structure. 
Among the theoretical models, the one suited to this purpose seems to be the centre-periphery 
(CP) model developed by Corsetti et al. (1998b). Under certain hypotheses these authors 
reject the traditional hypothesis that devaluations have negative welfare repercussions on 
partner countries. The impact of devaluations in fact depends on the relative and absolute size 
of the parameters of the model, the most important of which are discussed below. 
i) Elasticity of substitution between goods. The degree of substitutability of internationally 
traded goods is relevant when evaluating the impact of devaluation in one country owing to 
the transmission of shocks through trade because it determines the size and the direction of 
the demand-switching effects.
11 
ii) Firms pricing behaviour and exchange rate pass-through. The model determines the 
extent to which the effects of an exchange rate change are ‘passed-through’ to a firm’s export 
price. If the exchange rate is reflected in a one-for-one change in prices abroad, then it is 
referred to as ‘full pass-through’. If none of the exchange rate change is reflected in prices 
abroad it is referred to as ‘no pass-through’. 
With full pass-through, a devaluation of country A’s currency gives rise to an improvement in 
country B’s terms of trade, a reallocation of consumption away from country B goods, a 
decline in the market share of B exports in country C and a depreciation of country B’s 
exchange rate vis-à-vis country C. If country B wants to maintain the peg with country C, it 
must reduce the money supply, which implies greater appreciation vis-à-vis country A and a 
greater loss of market share in country C. If country B instead matches the devaluation of A’s 
currency, country B’s terms of trade and market shares do not change. The model shows that 
the negative affects arising from devaluation in a partner country are off-set in some cases by 
an improvement in the terms of trade. In fact, with full pass-through, country B also obtains a 
welfare gain from devaluation in country A because of the strong effect of its improvement in 
terms of trade on welfare. 
In case of no pass-through, Corsetti et al. (1998b) show that there are no relative price 
competitiveness effects and export shares of the devaluating country remain the same. 
Country A’s devaluation has a beggar-thy-neighbour effect as it reduces the exports, revenues 
and profits of producers in country B. The conclusion is more striking than the ones derived 
under the assumption of full pass-through: the optimal response for country B is always to 
devalue. Therefore, based on the centre periphery model, Corsetti et al. reach the conclusion 
that “if there is no pass-through, then direct bilateral trade links may play a more important 
role than competition in the third market in determining the transmission of exchange rate 
                                                           
11 The authors assume that the elasticity of substitution between centre and periphery goods is lower than or 
equal to that between periphery goods, i.e. ρ≤ψ. 10 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
shocks in the periphery. If there is full pass-through, a high share of bilateral trade within a 
region can actually limit the extent of beggar-thy-neighbour effects.” (See Box 1 below.) 
 
Box 1. Results of the centre-periphery model developed by Corsetti et al. (1998b) 
Corsetti et al. show that in the case of devaluations 
if:     (i) ρ>1* and ψ>ρ,  
        (ii) intra- periphery trade =0 
then: 
  ψ>1  ψ≤1 
Full pass-through  
(sellers currency) 
Beggar-thy-neighbour   Ambiguous (price effect and terms-
of-trade effect) 
No pass-through  
(buyer’s currency) 
Low vulnerability to 
currency crisis 
Low vulnerability to currency crisis 
 
if:     (i) ρ>1* and ψ>ρ,  
        (ii) intra- periphery trade > 0 
then: 
  ψ>1  ψ≤1 
Full pass-through  
(seller’s currency) 
Ambiguous (price effect 
and terms-of-trade effect) 
Ambiguous (price effect and terms-of-
trade effect) 
No pass-through  
(buyer’s currency) 
Beggar-thy-neighbour Beggar-thy-neighbour 
 
Notes: *The periphery as a whole runs a current account surplus vis-à-vis the centre when country A devalues; 
ψ elasticity of substitution between periphery goods; 
ρ elasticity of substitution between centre and periphery goods. 
 
iii) Degree of trade integration within the region. The stronger the intra-regional trade links 
are the more vulnerable the partner countries are because of the negative demand-switching 
effects of devaluations by competitors. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that under the 
assumption of full pass-through there are also positive effects of the improvement in the terms 
of trade of the devaluing country partner. 
3. Indicators  of  vulnerability linked to trade structure 
3.1  Why analyse the CEECs? 
The CEECs are a group of geographically close countries on the periphery of the European 
Union. All of the eight CEECs that joined the EU in May 2004 have declared their intention 
to adopt the euro as early as possible.
12 In terms of the announced monetary strategies of the 
countries it can be seen that for some of them the decision to join the ERM II
13 soon, from 
today’s perspective, may not suffer from substantial objections. 
                                                           
12 Following the procedures laid down in the Treaty of the Union, their aim is to introduce the euro at the 
beginning of 2007, subsequent to a two-year mandatory period within the ERM II starting around mid-2004 and 
a positive convergence assessment made around mid-2006. 
13 The ERM II is a pegged but adjustable system in which central parities are defined against the euro and not 
between all other participating countries. Hence this bilateral nature is expected to reduce the frequency and the HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 11 
 
In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic – the four larger 
Central European economies – the announced strategies suggest a careful examination. The 
open question is whether these countries would be able to cope with structural trends towards 
higher and more volatile output growth, increasing relative price levels and structural fiscal 
deficits without an independent monetary policy. Also, these four economies are the ones that 
would need the most aggressive fiscal tightening to meet the Maastricht criteria in time for an 
early adoption of the euro, which may significantly aggravate the economic costs of joining 
the ERM II.  
Hungary and the Slovak Republic are those that have most closely managed the exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the euro, in the first case through a peg to the euro and in the latter case from 
unilaterally shadowing a kind of ERM II framework. Therefore, they might consider 
continuing the present arrangements and joining the ERM II soon after EU accession, 
provided that fiscal imbalances are being contained.  
For the Czech Republic and Poland, it may be preferable to maintain their current floating 
exchange-rate regime for some time after EU entry, as inflationary targeting in these countries 
has overall proved a well-functioning framework for monetary policy and has delivered the 
primary objective of low inflation. 
In the case of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia the decision to join the ERM II soon 
and to adopt the euro after a short stay in the ERM II may not run counter to substantial 
objections. In fact, these countries have already renounced an autonomous monetary policy 
and they have managed to accommodate a catching-up process without using the exchange 
rate as an adjustment tool. Furthermore, fiscal deficit are contained, public debt is small and 
structural policy have been supportive. 
The eight countries, with the relative exception of Poland, are small and highly open 
economies that have tight trade relations with the EU. The degree of financial integration 
between the eight CEECs and the euro area still does not appear to be high and considerable 
differences exist across indicators and countries (see Table 1). All countries have experienced 
large and increasing capital inflows in recent years. By far the largest component of these 
flows is foreign direct investment, which is the component of capital flows less vulnerable to 
financial and currency disturbances. 
Although the total assets of banking systems as a ratio to GDP have risen in most acceding 
countries in recent years, the level of financial intermediation is low. This is because of the 
moderate GDP-per-capita levels, the relatively short history of banking sectors and the 
transition process that included bank consolidation and a strong presence of foreign-owned 
companies. 
Monetary transmission through interest and credit channels has become more effective in 
most acceding countries owing to improved banking sector soundness but it is still 
constrained as a consequence of the low depth of financial intermediation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
scope of interventions. Central rates and fluctuation bands are set by common agreement involving the ministers 
of the eurozone, the SECB governors of the AC. The standard fluctuation band is +-15% while not excluding the 
possibility of setting a narrower band. Intervention support of the ECB to NCB is automatic at the margins of the 
band (marginal interventions), any interventions within the band (intra-marginal intervention) need not to be (but 
may be) supported by the ECB. Finally, realignments of central parity are made by the common procedure, 
which both the ECB and the member states have the right to initiate. 12 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
Table 1. Exchange-rate regimes and compatibility with the ERM II 
  Exchange 
rate regime  Currency Features  Compatibility with the 
ERM II? 
Currency board   
Estonia  Currency 
Board to euro 
Estonian kroon 
– EEK (€ 1 = 
15.6466 EEK) 
Peg to euro since 1999 
(to DM before) 
Yes; Estonia will join the 
ERM II after acceding in 
2004. 
Lithuania  Currency 
Board to euro 
Lithuanian litas 
– LTL (€ 1 = 
3.4528 LTL) 
Peg to euro since 2 
February 2002 (to $US 
from 1 April 1994 to 2 
February 2002) 
Yes; Lithuania is planning to 
join ERM II. 
Fixed peg   
Latvia 
Peg to the 
SDR basket of 
currencies 
Latvian lats – 
LVL 
Exchange rate bands 
±1% of the central rate 
No, but it is planning to join 
the ERM II and to peg to the 
euro on 1 January 2005. 
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands 
(Unilateral shadowing of ERM II) 
Hungary  Peg to euro 
Hungarian 
forint – HUF (€ 
1= 284.1 HUF) 
Peg to euro with ± 15% 
fluctuation band; parity 
changed to 284.1 from 
276.1 as of 4 June 
2003. 
Yes. 
Managed float   
Slovak 
Republic  Managed float  Slovakian 
koruna – SKK 
Euro as a reference 
currency; foreign 
exchange market 
interventions. 
No; the Slovak Republic 
envisages participation in the 
ERM II in the medium term. 
Slovenia  Managed float  Slovenian tolar  Euro informally used as 
a reference currency 
No; Slovenia intends to enter 
the ERM II in the first half of 
2005. 
Czech 
Republic  Managed float  Czech koruna – 
CZK 
Floating regime since 
May 1997 
No; but it is planning to join 
the ERM II in the medium 
term. 
Free float   
Poland Free  float  Polish zloty – 
PLN  Inflation targeting 
No; but it is planning to join 
the ERM II and to peg to euro 
soon. 
Sources: Pre-Acceding Economic Programs 2003, ECB, EC. 
According to this research, the case of the CEECs is of great interest to study the transmission 
of currency shocks through trade, for three main reasons: 
i)  The CEECs are going to join the ERM II and eventually the EMU, abandoning (with the 
exception of Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania) a flexible exchange rate as an effective 
instrument for absorbing shocks.  
ii)  The CEECs are a group of geographically close countries that are very suitable for 
representing the periphery of the EU. They have a high degree of trade integration with HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 13 
 
the EU. It is possible to interpret the interdependences existing among the CEECs as the 
interaction that the centre-periphery model identifies for these periphery countries. 
iii) The CEECs’ financial markets are not yet developed and integrated. They seem to have a 
minor role in transmitting currency shocks. Thus trade linkages seem to be the main 
channel of transmission of disturbances. 
This paper attempts to answer two main issues: What role, if any, does trade and firms pricing 
behaviour have in determining the vulnerability of CEECs to currency shocks? What are the 
implications for the ERM II sustainability? If after or because of joining the ERM II a 
currency shock occurs in one of CEECs, what is the probability of a contagious devaluation 
occurring in the other countries in the group?  
3.2  Trade integration with the EU and intra-regional trade 
The evolution of trade in acceding countries has been remarkable in the 1990s. The degree of 
openness increased dramatically. The integration with the EU market (further strengthened by 
the Association Agreement signed bilaterally by those countries) led to an increase of their 
market shares in EU trade (Zaghini, 2003). 
The degree of openness is on average 92% of GDP (56.7% when taking into account only 
trade with the EU). The most open countries are Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
The eight CEECs (CEEC-8) entertain close trade relations with the EU, accounting on 
average for about 63.7% of total export and about 60.5% of total import (Table 2). This 
compares well with the level of trade integration among the current EU members, whose 
exports and imports within the EU are on average around 60% of total trade.  
It is worth noticing that, in the group, the countries that are relatively more highly integrated 
with the EU (Hungary, Latvia and Poland) are those with the lowest degree of openness. The 
most open economies, such as Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech and Slovak Republics, are less 
well-integrated with the EU. The lower trade integration with the EU might suggest that these 
countries, which also trade significantly with non-EU countries, could be somewhat more 
exposed to external demand shocks originating from non-EU counties than in the EU area. 
Table 2. Degree of openness and trade integration among the CEEC-8 (2002) 
  Degree of openness 
(Exp+imp)/GDP, (%) 
(ExpEu+ImpEu) 
/(ExpWorld+Imp 
World) 
Trade integration with the EU 
(EU export and import in % of 
total export and import) 
   To World  To EU    Export Import 
Czech Rep.  94.9  60.8  0.64  68.3  60.1 
Estonia  133.3 82.8  0.62  68.0 57.9 
Hungary 91.1  59.4  0.65  75.1  56.3 
Latvia 75.7  57.2  0.76  60.4 84.1 
Lithuania 92.1  43.3  0.47  49.6  45.2 
Poland 42.3  27.4  0.65  68.7 61.7 
Slovak Rep.  109.4 60.2  0.55  60.5 50.3 
Slovenia  97.3 62.1  0.64  59.4 68.0 
Average  92% 56.7%  0.62  63.7%  60.5% 
Sources: WEO IMF, Eurostat Newcronos, Bilateral Trade Database (BTD) and International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics (ITCS), 2003. 14 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
The analysis of CEECs’ bilateral export shares by destination confirms that the EU is the 
main market of destinations, the US and Japan having a minor role as export markets. Among 
the eight countries, trade shares with the other CEECs are heterogeneous with the lowest 
shares for Slovenia and the highest for Latvia (Table 3). 
Table 3. Bilateral export shares by destination (% total exports, 2002) 
Report 
Partner 
Czech 
Rep. 
Hungary Poland Slovak 
Rep. 
Estonia Latvia  Lithuania  Slovenia 
Czech Rep.  –  2.4  4.7  7.7  0.3  1  0.8  0.1 
Hungary 1.9  –  2.1  1.4  0.6  0.2  1.6  0.4 
Poland 4  2.3    1.4  0.5  0.3  6.3  0.1 
Slov.Rep. 15.2  5.4  5.3  –  1.8  1.8  2.8  0.1 
Estonia –  –  –  –    6  3.2  0.1 
Latvia –  –  –  –  7.7    12.6  12.6 
Lith.* –  –  –  –  4.1  8.35  –  0.3 
Slovenia –  –  –  –  0.02  0.1  0.0  – 
EU 68.3  75.1  68.7  60.5  60  67.3  63.1  66.2 
USA 2.9  3.5  2.7  1.4  2.2 4.3  3.8  2.8 
Japan 0.4  0.6  0.2 1  0.6 0.8 0.4  0.2 
World 100  100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Notes: *2001 
Sources: OECD, Bilateral Trade Database (BTD) and International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS) 
(2003) and author calculations on United Nations, Comtrade (2003). 
Two sub-groups emerge in which trade is more intensive. The first one is composed of the 
four largest countries (and also OECD members), the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
the Slovak Republic, while the second includes the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
plus Slovenia. There is evidence of intra-group trade in the region, though it seems to play a 
minor role. 
Based on classification SITC Rev. 3, in each of the eight countries manufactured goods 
account on average for about 77.4% of exports towards the EU. The national export shares of 
each product proxy the importance for any given country of the demand-switching effects that 
could arise from a devaluation by a competitor in that specific market. Interestingly, all the 
eight countries have a very similar export product composition, with machinery and transport 
equipment ranking first. Manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured articles and 
chemicals, and related products also have a major role in the export structure of most of 
CEECs. A large part of CEECs’ trade with the EU is intra-industrial, most of which is 
classified as vertical intra-industrial trade. This may suggest that countries with a high degree 
of intra-industrial trade will be subject to similar shocks and patterns of industrial activity. 
Table 4 shows the Glick and Rose (1998) trade share and direct trade indexes measuring 
competition in the third market (EU) and the direct trade linkages of CEECs respectively. The 
indexes prove that there is high competition among country pairs in the EU market and an 
extremely high number of bilateral trade links. It is worth noting that, even given the very 
high manufactured content of CEEC trade, the indexes computed for total trade and trade in 
manufactured goods only are not very similar. HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 15 
 
Table 4. Glick and Rose trade linkages* (2002) 
Country pairs  Competition in third markets (EU) 
(TradeShare
14 SITC Rev. 3) 
Direct linkages 
(Direct trade,
15 SITC Rev. 3) 
  Total Manufactures  Total Manufactures 
ee-lv 0.59  0.69  0.58  0.59 
ee-sk 0.62  0.72  0.85  0.53 
ee-sl 0.62  0.70  0.32  0.27 
ee-hu 0.68  0.78  0.74  0.48 
ee-pol 0.66  0.76  0.51  0.55 
ee-cz 0.65  0.74  0.52  0.41 
cz-lv 0.67  0.81  0.36  0.31 
cz-sk 0.65  0.81  0.85  0.80 
cz-sl 0.65  0.83  0.87  0.93 
cz-hu 0.71  0.79  0.83  0.81 
cz-pol 0.68  0.79  0.94  0.86 
hu-lv 0.73  0.99  0.22  0.27 
hu-sk 0.70  0.96  0.78  0.83 
hu-sl 0.70  0.98  0.76  0.90 
hu-pol 0.72  0.92  0.89  0.86 
sl-sk 0.58  0.69  0.92  0.97 
sl-pol 0.66  0.73  0.62  0.56 
sl-lv 0.57  0.66  0.27  0.26 
pol-sk 0.66  0.88  0.83  0.79 
pol-lv 0.68  0.89  0.24  0.24 
sk-lv 0.59  0.72  0.51  0.43 
Note: *2002 data for Lithuania are not available. 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on COMTRADE UN. 
 
According to the Glick and Rose, trade share indexes, all countries, with no exception, seem 
to compete more heavily with each other in the manufactured goods sector, having the EU as 
the destination market. 
The same result does not hold for intra-regional trade. In fact, the direct trade indexes show 
that all the CEECs compete against each other with few exceptions (Estonia-Slovenia, 
Hungary-Latvia, Slovenia-Latvia and Poland-Latvia). Nevertheless, the degree of 
competition, if only trade in manufactured goods is considered, decreases in more than half of 
the country pairs. 
3.3 Elasticity  of  substitution and trade structure 
The degree of substitutability of the different internationally traded goods is relevant in 
assessing a country’s vulnerability to the transmission of currency shocks. Other things being 
                                                           
14 Trade share i = Σk{[(x0k+xik)/(x0+xi)]*[1-|(x0k/x0)-(xik/xi)|((x0k/x0)+(xik/xi))]} •where: xik = export from i 
to k (k ≠ i, 0), 0 is the first victim country, x0 is total export of 0, xi is total export of i. This is a measure of trade 
linkages and competition in third markets that uses trade share so as to adjust for the varying size of countries. 
15 Direct trade i = 1- (| xi0-x0i | ⁄ (xi0 +x0i)). This index is higher the more equal the bilateral export is between 
countries 0 and i. 16 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
equal, it determines the size and the direction of the demand-switching effects. Indeed, the 
probability of devaluation is higher in countries producing exports similar to those of the ‘first 
victim’ countries than in the others. One simple measure of the substitutability of each 
country’s export is the Finger and Kreinin index (Table 5).
16  
Table 5. Indexes of export similarity: the Finger and Kreinin index
17 (on manufactures in % 
of manufactured goods exported, 2002, export market EU, SITC) 
 Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania Poland  Slovak 
Rep.  Slovenia 
Czech Rep.  80.7 85.3 47.7 61.1 87.4 94.7 88.4 
Estonia  –  70.4 66.6 75.4 91.2 85.2 88.4 
Hungary  –  –  71.2 53.6 76.7 80.4 74.5 
Latvia  –  –  –  59.1 60.2 51.9 57.7 
Lithuania  –  –  –  –  68.8 65.4 68.6 
Poland  –  –  –  –  –  92.2 95.3 
Slovak Rep.  –  –  –  –  –  – 93.4 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat Newcronos. 
Table 5 shows the index values for manufactured products as a percentage of total 
manufactured exports for 2002. These are computed for country pairs with SITC data. The 
common export market for country pairs is the EU-15. The indexes show a high degree of 
similarity among the CEECs, with the exception of the Czech Republic-Latvia country pair, 
whereby the index is relatively smaller. According to these results, trade channels seem to 
have a powerful role in transmitting currency shocks.  
Moreover, the evidence that countries of the same group produce goods that are very similar 
or a substitute in consumption suggests that changes in their bilateral exchange rates may 
reduce, even significantly, the welfare of its regional trading partners, through the reduction in 
the demand for their exports. 
3.4  Firms’ pricing policies in response to exchange-rate movements 
The exchange rate pass-through determines the extent to which the effects of an exchange-rate 
change are ‘passed-through’ to a firm’s export price. If the exchange rate is reflected in a one-
for-one change in prices abroad, then it is referred to as ‘full pass-through’. If none of the 
exchange-rate changes are reflected in prices abroad, it is referred to as ‘no pass-through’ or 
pricing-to-market. Theoretical analyses list a number of factors underlying the pricing 
decisions taken by export firms following an appreciation (or depreciation) of their currency. 
For example, let e be the nominal exchange rate, P
F the foreign firm’s price level expressed in 
domestic currency terms, with the foreign currency price being P
F/ e; the phenomenon of 
pass-through can be, therefore, expressed by dP
F/ de. Alternatively, a more convenient way of 
expressing the pass-through is by computing the price elasticity in the form (dP
F/ de) (e / P
F). 
                                                           
16 See Finger and Kreinin (1979); it is worth underlining that the use of aggregate data for the manufactured 
goods sector (given the lack of more disaggregated data) could produce an overestimation of the indexes. 
17 •ESij =￿a [min (xai, xaj)]* 100, xai and xaj are export shares of country i’s and country j’s manufactures 
exports in industry a. •ES = 0 = complete dissimilarity, ES = 100 = identical export composition. HAS TRADE ANY IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSMISSION OF CURRENCY SHOCKS? | 17 
 
In case the latter elasticity equals 1, the full pass-through condition holds, while no pass-
through arises in case of (dP
F/ de) (e / P
F)= 0 . 
The phenomenon of pass-through is the result of a combination of multiple factors, such as 
the degree of competitiveness of the market, the degree of substitutability among products, 
the possibility of achieving economies of scale relative to foreign competitors and how 
permanent the exchange rate devaluation is perceived to be. Therefore, it is difficult to make 
empirical generalisations or inferences about firms’ pricing behaviour merely based on the 
extent of the observed pass-through. 
In line with the scope of our work, we use a simple measure of exchange rate pass-through on 
export price, based on correlation coefficients and average price elasticity to exchange rate 
(Table 6). 
Table 6. Correlation between the export price index and the exchange rate against the euro 
(quarterly data, Q1-1999 to Q4-2002) 
  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Rep. 
Correlation coefficient  0.2 0.9 0.8 -0.1 
Average elasticity  0.3 1 0.9  0.1 
 
(quarterly data, Q2-1999 to Q4-2002) 
  Estonia Latvia  Lithuania  Slovenia 
Correlation coefficient  0.0 -0.0 0.5 
Average elasticity  0.0 -0.2 0.4 
Hps *Coricelli, 
Zsolt PT=1 
Notes: * Quarterly export price index data for Slovenia are not available, therefore we introduce assumption that 
the pass-through is = 1 derived by Coricelli et al. (2003) and Zsolt (2001). 
Source: Datastream. 
According to both correlation coefficients and average elasticities, the firms’ pricing 
behaviour in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in the period 1999-2002 has been that of 
maintaining export prices in terms of their currency close to the pre-appreciation 
(depreciation) levels. This firm policy in case of appreciation of the national currency against 
the euro implies a ‘skimming’ pricing strategy while in case of depreciation a ‘penetration’ or 
‘market share’ pricing strategy (Sundaram and Mishra, 1992). 
Lithuania is in a middle case with an average correlation between the export price index and 
the exchange rate against the euro of around 0.5. The export pricing policy of firms in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia and Latvia in the same period appears not to have 
followed exchange-rate movements.
18 
As mentioned before, a devaluation in a country in which there is pass-through and intra-
periphery trade lead on the one hand to the worsening of price competitiveness of its main 
trade partners and on the other hand to the improvement of their terms of trade. Thus under 
certain conditions if one of these countries devaluates the others have no incentive in 
matching the devaluation. 
                                                           
18 These results are in line with the studies of Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten (2003) and Zsolt (2001), according to 
which the point estimates of pass-through are higher in Slovenia and Hungary than in Poland, while the pass-
through is low in the Czech Republic. 18 | ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
 
In the case of Estonia, Latvia and the Slovak Republic, which seem to have a low pass-
through, if a devaluation arises, the intra-periphery effect of beggar-thy-neighbour owing to 
competition in the EU disappears. Yet there could be another source of the beggar-thy-
neighbour effect, owing to the decrease of export shares towards the devaluing country. This 
effect could worsen the economic conditions of trading partners in the periphery, giving them 
an incentive to match the devaluation.  
4. Conclusion 
In Table 7, the values of the similarity index and of pass-through are presented for each of the 
country pairs. The joint analysis of these indicators provides us with some indications 
concerning currency-shock transmission for each of the country pairs under examination.  
Table 7. The currency shock vulnerability of CEECs (2002) 
PT 
F.K 
0  0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 1 
 Sk  Lv  Ee  Cz  Lt Pl Hu  Sl 
95.3 –  –  –  –  –  Pl-Sl  –  Sl-Pl 
94.7 Sk-Cz –  –  Cz-Sk  –  –  –  – 
93.4 Sk-Sl  –  –  –  –  –  –  Sl-Sk 
92.2 Sk-Pl  –  –  –  –  Pl-Sk  –  – 
91.2 –  –  Ee-Pl –  –  Pl-Ee  –  – 
88.4 –  –  Ee-Sl Cz-Sl  –  –  –  Sl-Cz, Sl-
Ee 
87.4 –  –  –  Cz-Pl  –  Pl-Cz  –  – 
85.3 –  –  –  Cz-Hu  –  –  Hu-Cz  – 
85.2 Sk-Ee –  Ee-Sk –  –  –  –  – 
80.7 –  –  Ee-Cz Cz-Ee  –  –  –  – 
80.4 Sk-Hu –  –  –  –  –  Hu-Sk  – 
76.7 –  –  –  –  –  Pl-Hu  Hu-Pl  – 
75.4 –  –  Ee-Lt –  Lt-Ee  –  –  – 
74.5 –  –  –  –  –  –  Hu-Sl  Sl-Hu 
71.2 –  Lv-Hu –  –  –  –  Hu-Lv  – 
70.4 –  – Ee-Hu  –  –  –  Hu-Ee  – 
 –   –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
68.8  –  –  –  –  Lt-Pl  Pl-Lt  –  – 
68.6  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  Sl-Lt 
65.4  Sk-Lt  –  –  –  Lt-Sk  –  –  – 
66.6  –  Lv-Ee  EE-Lv  –  –  –  –  – 
61.1  –  –  –  Cz-Lt  Lt-Cz  –  –  – 
60.2  –  Lv-Pl  –  –    Pl-Lv  –  – 
59.1  –  Lv-Lt  –  –  Lt-Lv  –  –  – 
57.7  –  Lv-Sl  –  –  –  –  –  Sl-Lv 
53.6  –  –  –  –  Lt-Hu  –  Hu-Lt  – 
51.9  Sk-Lv  Lv-Sk  –  –  –  –  –  – 
47.7  –  Lv-Cz  –  Cz-Lv  –  –  –  – 
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In the northwest quadrant of the table – with an arbitrarily chosen lower threshold of the 
similarity index (70) and a low degree of pass-through (between 0 and 0.2) – there are the 
Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic. If a devaluation arises in these 
countries and there is intra-periphery trade, there is a higher probability that the currency 
disturbance will be transmitted to trading partners with similar trade structures. For example, 
if the Slovak Republic devalues, a devaluation could occur in the Czech Republic. This 
probability is enhanced by the following factors: i) a relatively high degree of bilateral trade 
between the two countries (15.2%), ii) a high index of export similarity (94.7%) as well as iii) 
bilateral competition (0.8%). 
Given that the Slovak Republic has a pass-through equal to 0, the beggar-thy-neighbour 
factor that precipitates the transmission of currency shocks is not because of a price 
competitive effect. The transmission mechanism occurs mainly through the bilateral trade 
links: once its currency is devalued, the Slovak Republic could reduce its import demand 
from the Czech Republic because Czech goods are expensive in its currency. The impact of 
an import demand switch-off increases as the bilateral trade between the two countries is 
greater and the similarity index between them is higher. Interestingly, a feedback effect could 
arise between the two countries. The Czech Republic also has a low degree of pass-through, 
in fact it is in the same quadrant of the table. Thus implications similar to those for the Slovak 
Republic hold if a devaluation originates in the Czech Republic. 
In the northeast quadrant of the table there are Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. If devaluation 
occurs in these countries, the shock could be transmitted through the channel of competition 
into the EU-15 market. Devaluation in Slovenia, which has a pass-through of 1, could prompt 
a devaluation in Poland, which has a very high similarity index with respect to Slovenia.  
On the one hand, after devaluation, Slovenia would gain competitiveness. This could cause a 
loss of export shares for Poland in the EU-15 market. On the other hand, Poland would 
benefit from a positive terms-of-trade effect. The transmission of shocks is positively 
correlated to the degree of competition of the country pairs in the EU-15 and to the degree of 
the similarity of export structures. Yet bilateral trade between Slovenia and Poland would 
contain the contagion owing to the effect on the terms of trade. 
It has to be noted that the bilateral trade between Poland and Slovenia is indeed very low 
(0.1%) This suggests that in this case the price-competitiveness effect will exceed the effect 
on the terms of trade, enhancing the possibility that currency disturbances would be 
transmitted. According to the previous findings (on low intra-periphery trade), this effect is 
likely for all of the country pairs in this quadrant. The remaining quadrants of the table 
represent intermediate situations and ambiguous results could be derived. Nevertheless, the 
logic underlying all the quadrants in the analysis is the same as in the northeast and northwest 
quadrants. 
To conclude, a general, theoretically backed framework has been used to interpret the role of 
trade-structure variables in the transmission mechanisms of currency disturbances. As a result 
of the heterogeneity in pass-through and trade structures, it is very difficult to derive a unitary 
policy implication on the potential sustainability of the ERM II. Yet it is possible to single out 
the country pairs that have a higher likelihood that currency shocks will be transmitted. 
Preliminary results point out that (other things being equal and given the contained intra-
periphery trade) the transmission of currency disturbances is lower if the disturbance 
originates in countries with low a pass-through rate (the Slovak and Czech Republics, Estonia 
and Latvia) and higher if it originates in countries with a high pass-through rate (Poland, 
Hungary and Slovenia).  | 20 
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